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Abstract 
 
For more than two decades, international healthcare crises and ensuing political debates have led to 
increasing professional governance and regulatory policy reform. Governance and policy reforms, 
commonly representing a shift from embodied trust in professionals to state enforceable trust, have 
challenged professional power and self-regulatory privileges. However, controversy remains as to 
whether such policies do actually shift the balance of power and what the resulting effects of policy 
introduction would be. This paper explores the roll-out and operationalisation of revalidation as 
medical regulatory reform within a United Kingdom National Health Service hospital from 2012-
2013, and its impact upon professional power. Revalidation policy was subject to the existing 
governance and management structures of the organisation, resulting in the formal policy process 
being shaped at the local level. This paper explores how the disorganised nature of the organisation 
hindered rather than facilitated robust processes of professional governance and regulation, 
fostering formalistic rather than genuine professional engagement with the policy process. 
Formalistic engagement seemingly assisted the medical profession in retaining self-regulatory 
privileges whilst maintaining professional power over the policy process. The paper concludes by 
challenging the concept of state enforceable trust and the theorisation that professional groups are 
effectively regulated and controlled by means of national and organisational objectives, such as 
revalidation. 
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Introduction 
Over a number of decades, professional governance and regulatory policy reforms have increased 
due to international healthcare crises. Ensuing political debates and concerns for patient safety have 
resulted in the introduction of healthcare professional regulatory policies seeking accountability and 
control of professional groups and individual professionals (Kuhlmann and Saks, 2008). In the United 
Kingdom (UK) in particular, major official public enquiries into healthcare scandals over the last 
three decades (for example, Commission for Health Improvement, 2001; Francis, 2013; Kirkup, 2015; 
Matthews, 2004; Pleming, 2005; Pauffley, 2004; Redfern, 2001; Ritchie, 2000) have attracted 
political interest. Subsequent recommendations for healthcare professional regulatory reform 
(Berwick, 2013; Smith, 2004; Kennedy Report, 2001) have initiated the inception of ‘revalidation’ to 
ensure quality of care and the safety of service users. Revalidation is a statutory government led, 
regulatory reform policy aimed at proactively assuring the continued fitness to practise of all 
registered and practising healthcare professionals within the UK (Department of Health, 2007). On a 
5 yearly revalidation cycle, registered and practising doctors must demonstrate their continued 
fitness to practice through annual appraisal and the development of a professional portfolio.  
Whilst revalidation is not a new concept within international healthcare professional regulation, 
revalidation marks the largest and potentially most significant development in the history of 
healthcare professional regulation within the UK. The introduction of revalidation by the General 
Medical Council (GMC) in 2012 placed a statutory requirement on registered medical professionals 
in the UK to provide proof of continued competence and fitness to practise post qualification. Such 
regulatory reform, arguably viewed as a form of ‘accountability-based enforceable trust’ (light, 
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2010), poses challenges to self-regulatory privileges and professional freedom from external control 
(Archer et al., 2012). New health regulatory policies, such as revalidation, are noted to frequently 
challenge existing power structures of professional groups, however, controversy remains as to 
whether new policies do shift the state-profession balance of power, and what the resulting effects 
of health policy introduction would be (Kuhlmann and Saks, 2008). This paper seeks to address this 
gap in knowledge, by drawing on a year-long ethnographic case study of one UK hospital during the 
2012-2013 rollout of medical revalidation in the UK. This paper presents empirical data which 
explores the real-time implementation of medical revalidation within the organisation, its impact 
upon professional power and the factors influencing the effective regulation of doctors. 
 
Sociological history of professional self-regulation  
Professional self-regulation has historically been underpinned by a ‘regulative bargain’ (Cooper et 
al., 1988 p.8) between the state, the professions and the public in recognition of professional 
monopoly over highly specialised knowledge and skill. Control over the content and terms of work, 
and the ability to be self-directing and self-regulating have traditionally been granted to professional 
groups, as the state and outsiders of such professional groups were assumingly unable to judge the 
performance of their professional work (Freidson, 1970b; Light, 1988).  It can be argued that when 
considering professional regulation, that the term ‘self-regulation’ is more complex than the term 
suggests (Allsop and Mulcahy, 1996), however at micro levels of medical practice, the regulation of 
practice and performance evaluation has traditionally been managed within the profession (Waring, 
2007).  Historically founded upon autonomy-based professionalism (Light, 2010), the medical 
profession have been trusted to regulate themselves, free from interference and control (Freidson, 
1970a).  
Over the past three decades however, sources of market and political pressure have arisen 
questioning the legitimacy of autonomy-based traditional professionalism (Light, 2010; Waring et al. 
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2010). Autonomous market behaviour and self-commercialisation, as well as publicised international 
healthcare scandals, have provoked questioning of unfettered autonomy and fuelled distrust in 
traditional professional self-regulation (Gray, 2004; Light, 2010). In response, and as a form of 
countervailing power against professions, the ‘buyer’s revolt’ ensued driving axes of change and a 
subsequent multi-dimensional transformation of professional work (Light, 2010: 278). Notably, 
governance and regulation of the professions in particular has changed in nature in response to 
demands for tighter regulation of health professionals (Kuhlman and Saks, 2008; Saks, 2010) and to 
rebuild societal trust in the medical profession. The evolution of governance and regulation is central 
to notion of enforceable trust (Ferlie, 2010), and principles of accountability-based new 
professionalism are at the core of emerging healthcare professional regulatory reform.  
Many authors have debated accountability-based new professionalism with the advent of New 
Public Management principles, clinical governance and performance management, and the impact 
of such countervailing power on the medical profession (Ferlie, 2010; Ferlie et al., 1996; Harrison, 
2004; Waring, 2007).  The impact of numerous regulatory, managerial and market reforms over the 
decades upon the medical profession, and the shifting balance of power between doctors and 
mangers, have been theorised as proletarianisation and deprofessionalisation. Proletarianisation 
was theorised due to the bureaucratisation of healthcare (Hardey, 1999; McKinlay and Arches, 1985; 
Weiss and Fitzpatrick, 1997) and deprofessionalisation, due to loss of professional autonomy and 
control over terms of their professional work (Gray, 2002; Haug, 1975; McKinlay and Stoeckle, 1988; 
Weiss and Fitzpatrick, 1997; Willis, 1989). 
Conversely, as a countervailing power against markets, the medical profession in particular have 
been theorised to subvert forms of external control, such as regulatory, managerial and market 
reforms, in an attempt to protect attributes of professionalisation (Freidson, 1970a; 1970b) and 
professional power (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1986; Larkin, 1983; Larson, 1977; 2012; Waring 2007).  
Moving forward from the deprofessionalisation thesis whereby changing patterns of professional 
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governance were theorised as a threat to professional autonomy, contemporary research and 
theorisation describes countervailing professional changes of ‘restratification’ (Freidson, 1994: 9) 
and more recently ‘re-professionalisation’ (Waring, 2014: 688). Restratification and re-
professionalisation suggests the context of professionalism and professional practices are 
restructured within the profession in response to countervailing market power and the shift from 
historical embodied trust based on competency and reputation to enforceable, informed trust (Light, 
2010; Speed and Gabe, 2013). Re-professionalisation in particular highlights the emergence of 
professional-managerial hybrids, whereby professionals in professional-managerial roles, either 
incidentally or willingly, are hybridising professionalism in organisational and policy contexts 
(McGivern et al., 2015a; Waring, 2014) in an attempt to retain professional power.  
 
Reforming of UK medical self-regulation: From embodied to enforceable 
trust 
The introduction of revalidation as regulatory reform in the UK can be discussed in relation to the 
concept of accountability-based new professionalism and enforceable trust (Light, 2010; Speed and 
Gabe, 2013). Revalidation has developed as a consequence of distrust in self-regulatory function, a 
central concept of new professionalism, and has become an integral part of the UK National Health 
Service (NHS) modernisation agenda. Revalidation in the UK is described as a statutory mechanism 
that allows health professionals to demonstrate that they remain up-to-date and can demonstrate 
that they continue to meet the requirements of their professional regulator. Revalidation aims to 
confirm that the registrant is practising in accordance with their regulators’ professional standards 
and identify poor practice where local systems are inadequate or absent (Health and Social Care Act, 
2008). Informed by the concept of accountability-based enforceable trust (Light, 2010), revalidation 
represents the process of imposing professionalism ‘from above’, whereby national and 
organisational objectives seeking to regulate and control professional groups are external to, and 
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outside the direct influence of, the profession. Evetts (2012) suggests that where standards of 
professionalism are imposed ‘from above’, the balance in control and power is thought to shift. The 
anticipated effects are power and control seized by the organisational and regulatory elites, as well 
as wider government structures, resulting in a loss of professional power and control ‘from within’. 
Evaluating the impact of regulation upon professional groups however is challenging, as regulatory 
processes are generally applied universally in circumstances where there are many other influences 
or pressures on the behaviour of those being regulated, provoking both positive and negative effects 
(Walshe and Boyd, 2007). Wider health policy literature acknowledges that successful 
implementation of regulation is further dependent on the organisational implementation approach 
adopted, such as top-down or bottom-up approach, ultimately influencing the operationalisation, 
interpretation, organisation, application and subsequent compliance in practice (Anderson and Sotir 
Hussey, 2006; Buse et al., 2012). There is existing debate within the literature regarding the 
enforceability and effectiveness of top-down governance processes within organisations. In times of 
challenge, it is recognised that the medical profession has demonstrated the ability to resist top-
down governance and retain its professional power (McDonald et al., 2013; Spyridonidis and Calnan, 
2011; Waring, 2007).  Salter (2004) in particular discussed the failure of government to adequately 
enforce clinical governance, and highlighted how doctors were able to control operationalisation. 
This resulted in a stark contrast between the reality of clinical governance implementation and the 
Government proposed clinical governance ideology (Department of Health, 1998). Additionally, and 
specifically in relation to the national implementation of revalidation, Salter (2007) highlighted how 
the medical profession had battled for control over the revalidation policy process, resulting in a 
significant delay with National revalidation policy implementation. 
The intended consequences of professional regulatory processes are to provide transparency against 
standards, expose poor regulation and poor performance and deliver improvements in healthcare 
(Hood and Heald, 2006). Professional regulation however can produce unintended consequences 
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which are more difficult to detect and measure (Hood, 2006), such as superficial ‘tick box’ 
paperwork compliance, which neither reflects nor improves the nature of care in professional 
practice (Chamberlain, 2010; Hood, 2006; McGivern and Ferlie, 2007; McGivern and Fischer, 2010, 
2012; McGivern et al., 2009; Walshe and Boyd, 2007; Waring, 2009). There is a body of literature 
which primarily focus on the relationship between regulation and behavioural compliance (Currie et 
al., 2009; Quick, 2011; Munro, 2011; Scraggs et al., 2012; Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006), 
demonstrating the continued challenging nature of regulating professional groups and the impact of 
these professional groups as countervailing power. 
Taking these debates forward, health regulatory policies, such as revalidation, have been theorised 
to challenge existing professional power structures and enforce trust by means of accountability-
based new professionalism, however controversy remains as to whether new policies do successfully 
shift the balance of power, and what the resulting effects of such health policy introduction would 
be (Kuhlmann and Saks, 2008; Salter 2004). Scholarly debates have therefore highlighted that the 
impact of governance and regulatory reform upon professional groups, and the ability of the state to 
effectively regulate professional groups remains open for investigation and questioning (Kirkpatrick 
et al., 2005; Waring 2007). This paper seeks to contribute to such debate by exploring the real-time 
implementation of medical revalidation within a UK NHS hospital, its impact upon professional 
power and the factors influencing the effective regulation of doctors. 
 
The study 
Fieldwork was undertaken over one year between October 2012 and October 2013 in one medium-
sized English NHS District General Hospital.  In assuming that reality is socially constructed within the 
healthcare setting, the author took an interpretive ethnographic case study approach to the study 
design (Denzin, 1996). The author deemed an interpretive ethnographic approach the most effective 
way of gaining an in-depth understanding of the operationalisation of revalidation in the 
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organisation, and the resulting effects of its introduction on professional power. A single site study 
was therefore chosen to facilitate an in-depth enquiry to aid in the understanding and appreciation 
of nuances of emerging regulatory reform within a complex multi-disciplinary context.  
The single site case study provided insightful nuanced research findings. In addition it was also 
opportunistic as open access to the research site had been granted as the research site was a former 
place of employment for the author. As a researcher within their own culture (Tota, 2004), 
strangeness was not a given but an achievement (Ybema and Kamsteeg, 2009). The author 
addressed this by self-reflection and ‘deconstructing taken-for-granted understandings’ (Ybema and 
Kamsteeg, 2009 p.111). Taking a career break, and being absent from the organisation between 
October 2011 and August 2012, aided this process and was a factor which enabled the author to 
‘make the familiar strange’ (Van Maanen, 1995 p.20). The author had 15 years prior experience of 
working in the organisation, however the culture and daily working practices within the organisation 
on re-entering the field after 11 months were not familiar.  
 
Methods 
 
Posters informing staff of the research and the author's presence were displayed in all staff areas 
throughout the observation period. Participant information sheets were displayed in all staff areas, 
inviting their voluntary participation. Additionally, at initial face-to-face encounter the author 
confirmed staff were happy to be involved in the study; one doctor declined to take part due to an 
ongoing Fitness to Practise investigation. During the research process the author gathered data at 
organisational, departmental and individual professional levels. Data was generated through 
documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and observation. The author was present within the field 
for over 300 hours during the research period and non-participant observation was conducted at 
managerial and departmental levels. Due to the confidential nature of appraisal meetings the author 
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was unable to gain access and observe appraisal and revalidation recommendation meetings 
between appraisees and appraisers. Chronological fieldnotes were made contemporaneously in a 
journal, paying particular attention to raw format and thick description (Allen, 2010). 
The author reviewed the archival and contemporary policy documents relating to revalidation, both 
locally and nationally. Documents that the author selected for analysis were Department of Health 
publications, professional regulator and professional body publications as well as local NHS 
Foundation Trust policy, guidance and literature. Documents were limited to these authors to 
ensure the reliability and authenticity of the document content and the ability to compare local and 
national policy. The author used the computer software NVivo 10 to assist an ethnographic content 
analysis approach to documentary analysis (Altheide, 1987). The author took a purposive sampling 
approach for interview selection as this method was most appropriate for selecting participants with 
a mixed level of skills and experience, in addition to recruiting management personnel (May, 2011). 
Both informal and formal interviewing techniques were adopted during the research (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007). Informal interviewing consisted of conversational type discussion in practice 
areas with consenting staff about their revalidation experiences.  During the research process two 
Trust management personnel responsible for revalidation implementation and 16 doctors consented 
to a formal interview (Table 1).  
Position within Organisation Number of interviewees 
Trust Management Personnel (responsible for 
local operationalisation of revalidation)  
2 
Responsible Officer and Head of Revalidation 
Appraiser (responsible for conducting 
appraisals and revalidation recommendation 
assessments, as well as being appraisees) 
4 
Consultant (appraisees responsible for meeting 
revalidation requirements) 
12 
 
All formal interviews were conducted in private offices away from clinical areas and a topic guide 
was used to ensure a level of consistency.  All interviews were electronically recorded and 
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transcribed verbatim, and together with observational fieldnotes, the author used the computer 
software NVivo 10 to assist with organising and coding the data. The author took an iterative, 
inductive and constant comparative approach to data generation and analysis (Charmaz, 2006). 
Triangulation of fieldnotes and interview transcripts, and an iterative process of thematic coding 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), informed subsequent interview and observational activity. This 
process provided a framework for iterative coding and, with the triangulation of content 
documentary analysis, subsequent data categorisation and abstraction (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007). The author was focused on exploring the operationalisation and effectiveness of revalidation 
policy at local level in comparison to national policy recommendations, as well as the impact such 
regulatory reform had upon professional regulatory power amongst the medical profession. 
Throughout the research process the NHS Research Governance Framework (Department of Health, 
2005) was followed and ethical approval for the research was acquired from the Local Research 
Ethics Committee in August 2012 (Health Research Authority, 2016). Research approval and site 
access was granted from the Trust Research and Development department prior to commencement. 
This research was a University funded project as part of a Doctoral training programme.  
 
Results 
Policy and Procedures for Medical Appraisal and Revalidation 
 
The team members who held responsibilities for the implementation of medical appraisal and 
revalidation included the Responsible Officer (RO), the Head of Revalidation (HoR), and 20 
appraisers, who will be referred to as the Revalidation Implementation Team. The organisation did 
have a medical appraisal and revalidation policy in place which appeared to be informed by national 
GMC standards and guidance (GMC, 1998; 2010). The organisational policy reflected the national 
recommendation for medical appraisal and revalidation in that every non–trainee doctor had a 
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timely, annual appraisal and a rolling five yearly cycle of revalidation. In order to achieve the aims of 
revalidation, the GMC required assurance that organisational systems of medical appraisal and 
clinical governance were functioning effectively and fairly in monitoring the conduct and 
performance of doctors, supporting appraisal and revalidation processes (GMC, 2013), and that ROs 
were able to make correct and valid revalidation recommendations (Revalidation Support Team, 
2011). This assurance was provided by a two phase Organisational Readiness Self-Assessment 
(ORSA) for the implementation of revalidation. Prior to revalidation roll-out, the RO had submitted a 
positive self-assessment declaring organisational readiness for the implementation of revalidation. 
This positive self-assessment was self-confirmation that the organisation had the ability to support 
revalidation processes, in providing the appropriate resources and the required evidence to support 
robust annual medical appraisal processes. The systems required within the organisation in order to 
monitor conduct and performance, as well as support the organisational appraisal and revalidation 
processes, were multiple. These could be aligned to the types of supporting information required for 
the appraisal process (GMC, 2011) as detailed in Table one. Within the organisational policy, the RO 
was documented to have the responsibility to ensure that organisational systems were in place to 
enable individual doctors to obtain statistical data and other relevant information needed for their 
annual appraisal. 
Table one: Types of Supporting Information required and corresponding governance process 
Supporting Information for Appraisal Organisational Governance Process 
Continuing Professional Development Mandatory Training (Fire/Health & 
Safety) 
Specialty Training (Specialty updates) 
Role Specific (appraiser training) 
Quality Improvement Activity Clinical Audit Data 
Clinical Outcomes Data 
Case Note Review 
Significant Events Risk Management Data (untoward 
incidents/never events) 
Feedback from Colleagues &  
Feedback from Patients 
360 Feedback Process 
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Review of Complaints and Compliments Complaints/Compliments Data 
 
Individual doctors were responsible for engaging with the annual appraisal and revalidation process, 
by compiling a portfolio of evidence and meeting with their appraiser annually.  It was a joint 
responsibility of the appraiser and the appraisee to ensure that the required evidence was present 
and that the outcome of the annual appraisal and revalidation recommendation process were 
forwarded to the Responsible Officer for review and action as necessary. During the research 
process, however, it was evident that appraisal and organisational governance process issues, and 
the disorganised nature of the organisation, impacted upon the implementation of revalidation.  
 
Disorganised nature of the organisation 
Observational findings highlight the complex nature of day to day organisational life and how, in 
many ways, this particular organisation was far from organised. There was a top-down approach to 
policy implementation, and a frequent change of team personnel exacerbated a lack of organisation 
and poor communication within the Revalidation Implementation Team. The process of feedback 
escalation and the delegation of responsibility within the Revalidation Implementation Team 
detailed in the organisational policy (Figure 1) were markedly different to that observed by the 
author in practice (Figure 2). The office manager, an administrative worker, functioned as the 
lynchpin of the Revalidation Implementation Team. The competing clinical and managerial workload 
pressures of the team led to a lack of time to meet as a team and a subsequent lack of 
communication between team personnel. Silo working had resulted whereby appraisers were taking 
responsibility for revalidation implementation at departmental level. This was exacerbated by the 
absence of a clear management structure and resulted in a lack of guidance and support across the 
Revalidation Implementation Team.  
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Figure 1: The Revalidation Implementation Team responsibility (organisational policy) 
 
 
Figure 2: The Revalidation Implementation Team responsibility (observed) 
 
Green arrow signifies absence of planned feedback escalation 
Red arrows signify observed feedback escalation                                          (Fieldnotes 180313) 
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There was also a noted inconsistency in appraiser training within the organisation. As a consequence 
of differing levels of training and experience, the HoR reported that appraisers were approaching 
revalidation with differing approaches and perceptions of the policy process. 
‘’50 percent [of appraisers] are actually saying maybe it’s just a paper exercise and the other 
50 percent are saying, no it’s not…two ways to look at it really, I mean when I actually 
revalidated the first batch of doctors, I thought is it a paper exercise, or am I doing 
something right? And I took the way that I reviewed all their folders, all the appraisal folders 
to make sure that they are up to date, that they have got good feedback from their 
colleagues, that they have got good feedback from the patients…They have reflected on 
what they have learnt…On the other hand the other group of people…tick, tick, tick, tick, fine 
next’’ (Consultant 8/HoR). 
The HoR also reported that differing approaches and perception of appraisers was in part due to the 
non-standardised appraisal system within the organisation. 
‘’At the moment what’s happening is we have still got a non-standardised paper based 
appraisal system. It’s difficult to keep an eye on that because the doctors come and go from 
the Trust’’ (Consultant 8/HoR). 
The non-standardised paper based appraisal system within the organisation was therefore 
highlighted as an ongoing challenge within the organisation. The lack of ability to ensure the robust, 
standardised implementation of the appraisal and revalidation policy was evident in further 
observations of the translation of organisational policy into local practice. In order to promote 
standardised departmental practices and limit manipulation of the appraisal and revalidation 
process, the organisational policy recommended that the appraiser was located within the same 
speciality as the appraisee. In reality however, appraisers frequently conducted appraisals outside 
their area of specialty due to appraisee choice. 
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‘’I’m a gynaecologist and I personally appraise, well the last year was predominantly 
community paediatricians…two of the gynaecologists decided to come to me, an 
anaesthetist, a Consultant from A&E…an Ophthalmologist, so a bit of a spread of different 
types of Consultants who decided to come to me’’ (Consultant 5/Appraiser). 
The Revalidation Implementation Team therefore faced many challenges in leading the 
implementation of national revalidation policy recommendations within the organisation due to a 
lack of standardisation within the organisation. 
 
Appraisal and Organisational Governance Process Issues 
Despite the positive ORSA and the detailed organisational medical appraisal and revalidation policy, 
issues were identified with the effectiveness of appraisal and organisational governance processes 
during the implementation of medical revalidation at local level. The HoR acknowledged that the 
existing organisational IT and governance systems for providing supporting information to doctors to 
underpin appraisal and revalidation were inadequate, stating that the organisational governance 
systems did not provide doctors with the required data for their appraisal and revalidation 
assessment.  
‘’…asking about complaints, and again about the serious untoward incidents that is a form of 
clinical governance that needs to be tightened up on...that’s actually the responsibility of the 
organisation to provide that data to the individual doctor and we don’t… we do not have the 
relevant IT processes to support revalidation requirements. The Trust has to play their role to 
provide the data, it has to be more transparent, it has to be more up to date’’ (Consultant 
8/HoR). 
Feedback from colleagues and patients was facilitated by an external company, based on an email 
system of feedback. The systems to provide complaints and significant events data however were 
 16 
 
not as formalised. Within the organisation each individual doctor had the responsibility of contacting 
the complaints and risk management departments to ask for personalised data for their appraisal 
and revalidation assessment. The lack of IT infrastructure to facilitate the gathering of supporting 
information for individual appraisal and revalidation meant that much of the evidence supporting 
non-involvement in untoward events, never events and complaints was written self-declaration of 
non-involvement. Data in the form of a printed report from the relevant departments was not 
expected as this was unobtainable. With self-declaration, there was an assumption that the 
individual doctor had contacted the relevant department for verification rather than their 
declaration being based on the fact that they had not been notified of any involvement in any 
complaints or untoward incidents by individual departments. Appraisers reported that a lack of 
robust purposeful data was a significant issue within the organisation, recognising that the data 
available within the organisation did not provide adequate assurance of fitness to practise. 
Appraisers acknowledged how being provided with individual complication rates and resource usage 
would be helpful in the assurance of fitness to practise of individuals. 
 ‘’It would be very helpful for all of us [appraisers] to be able to say to somebody…why is it do 
you think you use twice as much blood as anyone else? Or why do you think your patients go 
back to theatre twice as often but that information is not to hand, which is a weakness. I’ll 
bet you very few doctors in this country have the evidence, you’d say, and what’s your 
complication rate with say vaginal hysterectomy? They’d say I’ve got no problems, you’d say, 
give us the evidence for that, and they say, there isn’t any’’ (Consultant 7/Appraiser). 
 ‘’I think it’s a big failing at the moment that we [the organisation] don’t provide data across 
all specialties. Cardiac surgeons now have to send in a lot of information...and so yes, there 
are true comparative databases going on in some of the specialities, I don’t think enough at 
the moment though. It’s certainly not done here [in Maternity]’’ (Consultant 5/Appraiser). 
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The acknowledgment that such data was not available, coupled with the difficulties associated with 
the gathering of meaningful individual data as evidence, raised further worry amongst members of 
the Revalidation Implementation Team. The potential for manipulation of the appraisal process was 
a shared concern, expressing issues with the individual responsibility of the doctor in providing the 
required supporting information. 
‘’…at the moment, it’s the doctor’s responsibility to provide that data for the appraisal… 
everybody’s appraisal folder should  say that he was involved in so many complaints, he was 
involved in so many serious untoward incidents… we should be spot on about providing the 
data about the individual’s practice, but at the moment, it’s not uniformly implemented. And 
I think people might manipulate onto that side of it, because it’s not available and that is a 
real worry’’ (Consultant 8/HoR). 
The HoR and appraisers expressed similar concerns about potential manipulation of the current 
system whereby data can be omitted from the appraisal and revalidation process, and the data 
presented is selected by the individual. This highlights two potential issues. The first being that 
appraisers reported, and the author observed, a variation in appraisee portfolios and a lack of robust 
evidence to support individual revalidation assessment. The existing appraisal process was 
acknowledged as being potentially flawed as data and information presented within the appraisal 
portfolio was selectively biased. This was based on the doctor choosing what data to include and 
then needing to generate this data. Secondly, there appeared to be an element of acceptance within 
the appraiser-appraisee relationship, in that the selectiveness of the data presented was 
acknowledged as not providing a true reflection of fitness to practise. This was evident in the 
acceptance of the limitations of the current organisational processes with no additional processes in 
place to validate the evidence presented by an appraisee, or to obtain the evidence that was 
omitted.  
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This practice may have been symptomatic of long standing poor practices whereby appraisals have 
been historically conducted as an end in themselves regardless of the extent to which they are a 
meaningful interaction. This was evidenced in an archived version of the ‘Policies and Procedures for 
Medical Appraisal and revalidation’ which recommended that appraisal and revalidation 
assessments should still take place in the absence of supporting information. When the author 
reviewed the current version of the policy document, this sanction had been removed. The HoR 
stated this sanction had been removed to assist with revising the existing organisational appraisal 
process and to foster an expectation that individual appraisals should be informed by all of the 
evidence available to appraisers and appraisees. Interviewees however described appraisals as being 
conducted without the required data. Field observation, interviewee accounts and local documents 
suggest that minimal change had occurred in the way that appraisals were managed due to the 
continued use of non-standardised appraisal and revalidation processes, organisational governance 
process issues and inconsistent appraiser training and experience.   
 
Formalistic compliance at organisational and individual levels 
Despite the difficulties associated with medical appraisal and the ‘successful’ implementation of 
revalidation as previously highlighted, all medical professionals who had a revalidation assessment 
during the research process received a positive recommendation for revalidation by the appraisers. 
All medical professionals who had received a revalidation assessment were therefore recommended 
by the RO for successful revalidation, and were subsequently granted revalidation by the GMC. It 
was suggested by a consultant who had resigned from their role as an appraiser that the process of 
revalidation within the organisation had been reconstructed compared to the national policy. 
‘’You had to provide more evidence [for revalidation], but you know…I think we have fudged 
it at this Trust …we haven’t got the core information that tells you whether I’m a good 
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surgeon or not, and we should have really, we are supposed to be providing it, that’s the 
thing…I think the Appraisers here have signed people off without seeing it’’ (Consultant 9). 
The process of revalidation had also been interpreted by consultants as no different to the previous 
process of medical appraisal within the organisation, despite the national policy process aiming to 
strengthen the existing medical appraisal process. 
 ‘’I think it’s just a nice new name we are giving to something that we have been doing 
already’’ (Consultant 3). 
This may arguably be due to the perception that little had changed with the revalidation process 
within the organisation, and that the required evidence for the revalidation assessment was not 
readily available. Consultants also expressed minimal personal benefit from engaging with the 
revalidation process. 
‘’Well, from the point of view of being revalidated. All that’s happened is that on the basis of 
my last appraisal, I’ve been revalidated…I can now go on a list which says the following 
doctor has been revalidated...my name will be there. That doesn’t actually make any 
personal difference to me, apart from the fact that I don’t have to worry about it again’’ 
(Consultant 7/Appraiser). 
In addition, time was expressed as a significant barrier to engaging with revalidation.  
Mr X approached me to say ’I’ve been meaning to contact you, but just to let you know that 
I’m all up to date with revalidation and my appraisals, so you don’t need to worry about me’ 
They had assumed that I was to ‘checking’ that doctors within the organisation had gathered 
all of the required data for their appraisal and revalidation assessment. When I reassured the 
doctor about the aims and objectives of my research project, they divulged that their 
appraisal and revalidation discussion was the following month and they currently had no 
paperwork or data to support this assessment. Reasons for this were cited as the complex 
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nature of gathering the data and a lack of time to generate the specific data required 
(fieldnotes 100513). 
This scenario suggests that revalidation had been interpreted as an ad hoc paperwork and data 
gathering exercise rather than a culture change towards a continual process of professional 
development. Organisational and individual responses to revalidation implementation therefore 
support the notion of formalistic compliance in that the letter of regulatory direction (i.e. 
engagement with a statutory process) had become the primary goal, rather than the broader 
regulatory purpose (demonstrating the fitness to practise of doctors).  
 
 
Discussion 
Assuming that enforceable trust is achievable and that state regulation effectively regulates 
professionals, professionalism is assumed to be imposed ‘from above’, whereby national and 
organisational objectives regulate and control professional groups (Light, 2010; Speed and Gabe, 
2013). This is opposed to professional groups being in control of bargaining with the state to secure 
and maintain its regulatory responsibilities ‘from within’. Evetts (2012) suggests that where 
standards of professionalism are imposed ‘from above’, the balance in control and power is thought 
to shift. The anticipated effects are power and control seized by the organisational and regulatory 
elites, as well as wider government structure, resulting in a loss of professional power and control 
‘from within’. 
Data presented within this paper however challenges the concept of enforceable trust. Due to 
organisational issues with revalidation implementation within the research site, the medical 
profession was able to subvert the full extent of scrutiny envisaged by the national policy of 
revalidation. This was primarily due to organisational barriers preventing effective revalidation 
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implementation, thereby assisting doctors in maintaining professional power (Freidson, 1970a; 
1970b). Findings highlight formalistic paperwork compliance (Chamberlain, 2010; Walshe and Boyd, 
2007) with medical appraisal and revalidation. Within the organisation, a formalistic style of 
interaction with the GMC and wider regulatory policy had developed, and it appeared that 
compliance with the letter of regulatory direction (i.e. positive revalidation recommendations) had 
become the primary goal, rather than the broader regulatory purpose (assurance of fitness to 
practise).  
Both national and organisational policy had been shaped by the internal processes of the 
organisation, and as such, local revalidation implementation did not mirror national policy guidance. 
During the research process however, every doctor received a positive outcome and was 
recommended to the GMC by the RO for revalidation. This suggests conformance behaviour, 
engaging with the formal processes of revalidation, but done solely to satisfy regulators and 
resulting in little if any value for service users or the organisation (Walshe and Boyd, 2007). This 
suggests that the RO had failed to fulfil their statutory responsibility in being able to fulfil the 
envisaged primary purpose of revalidation, in assuring that licensed doctors employed by the 
organisation were fit to practise (GMC, 2010a; Revalidation Support Team, 2013). Individuals 
occupying managerial roles were also limited in their ability to exercise control over fellow 
professionals, as they themselves were restricted by the ‘disorganised’ nature of the organisation. 
This scenario challenges the notion of enforceable trust (Light 2010). The individuals occupying 
organisational management and governance roles were neither able to exercise the personnel 
oversight required, nor regulate and control individual professionals by means of organisational 
objectives. The Revalidation Implementation Team was restricted by the organisational processes 
which existed to assist them with governing professionals, ultimately resulting in a failure to 
‘enforce’ enforceable trust.  
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As a consequence of ineffective organisational processes, medical professionals were able to directly 
and indirectly influence the implementation and management of revalidation and thereby maintain 
self-regulatory power. Therefore, despite the statutory policy of revalidation being imposed ‘from 
above’, the balance in control and power did not shift as anticipated with enforceable trust. 
Engagement with the policy process, however, did assist doctors in retaining an element of ‘self-
regulation’ preserving a theorised core characteristic of health professionalism (Freidson, 1970a), 
whilst also maintaining professional power over the policy process (Freidson, 1986). Findings 
question the fitness for purpose of organisational regulatory processes in ensuring the competency 
and performance of individual professionals, and the regulatory process that ultimately determines 
whether individual professionals maintain their licence to practice. Due to the single site case study, 
the author cannot claim the findings are transferable to other organisations. The author calls for 
further research to extend, elaborate and examine the significance of these findings in other 
organisations. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper provides insight into the challenges of implementing national health policy at local level 
and its effect upon professional power. Data presented highlights the challenges in attempting to 
tightly regulate health professionals by means of national regulatory policy, due to the inefficiency of 
organisations and professionals, and their ineffectiveness in enforcing ‘enforceable trust’ (Light, 
2010; Speed and Gabe, 2013). Data in this paper highlights the challenges associated with enforcing 
mechanisms of enforceable trust, such as revalidation, as control was not seized by the 
organisational and regulatory elites, or wider government structures as anticipated. As a result, 
medical professionals were able to directly and indirectly influence the implementation and 
management of revalidation and thereby maintain self-regulatory power. This paper supports the 
view that the scholarly debate regarding the ability of the state to effectively regulate professional 
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groups remains open for investigation and questioning (Kirkpatrick et al., 2005; Waring 2007). 
Moreover, this paper indicates that the existing debate regarding enforceable trust, through top-
down governance, does not adequately consider the impact of organisational factors and 
professional countervailing power upon the contemporary profession-state regulatory power 
struggle. 
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